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Abstract 
This paper investigates the non-linear adjustment of prices between farm and retail prices in 
the lamb sector in Spain, using a three-regime Threshold Autoregressive Model. The results 
indicate that, in the long run, price transmission is perfect and any supply or demand shocks 
are fully transmitted along the marketing chain. In the short run, price adjustments between 
the farm and the retail levels are asymmetric and reveal a demand-pull transmission 
mechanism. On the other hand, retailers benefit from any shock, whether positive or negative, 
that affects supply or demand conditions.  
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1 Introduction 
The issue of marketing margins and price transmission along the food chain has attracted 
considerable research interest among agricultural economists, as it has long been considered 
relevant to Structure, Conduct and Performance (SCP) analyses. In the last two decades, the 
number of studies on this subject has grown sharply in response to concerns that rapid 
changes in markets and business practices could generate potentially important welfare and 
policy implications. It is commonly felt that retail prices do not react very quickly to changes 
in market conditions. A good example is where retail prices remain sticky although input 
prices have fallen due to primary production increases (Peltzman, 2000). In this situation, the 
retail price is equal the marketing clearing price, thus generating excess supply, and 
consumers do not benefit from declining farm prices, with implications for consumer welfare. 
Policy makers are also concerned about the extent to which consumers benefit from a 
reduction in farm prices as a consequence of agricultural policy reform.  
However, as Vavra and Goodwin (2005) pointed out, although the evolution of margins over 
time and price transmission have been considered jointly in the literature, they are different 
topics, and their analysis provides information on different, although complementary, 
questions. Many empirical studies have been concerned with the determinants of marketing 
margins and price spreads along the food chain, leading authors to use structural models 
(Gardner, 1975; Cowling and Waterson, 1979) under some restrictive assumptions (constant 
returns to scale, perfect competition and fixed-proportions production technology). Recently, 
a number of studies have developed a new theoretical background in order to allow for the 
presence of market power and returns to scale and their impact on price adjustment processes 
(McCorriston et al., 2001; Sexton et al., 2003; Lloyd et al., 2006)1. Although structural 
models are better at finding explanations for imperfections in price transmission, in most 
papers there is a gap between the theoretical model and the empirical application, as some of 
the marketing margin determinants are unobservable. 
Partly for this reason, much of the empirical literature dealing with price transmission has 
been concerned only with applying time-series modelling techniques to price data. The main 
focus of this approach has been to characterise vertical price relationships by the extent, speed 
and nature of the adjustments via the supply chain to market shocks generated at different 
levels in the marketing process. Thus, it complements the marketing margin models, which 
are mainly concerned with testing for market imperfections and calculating the price 
transmission elasticity. Particular importance has been given in recent research to the question 
of asymmetry of price adjustments. When based only on price data, the main shortcoming of 
asymmetric price transmission studies is the lack of empirical tests to explain any 
imperfections found. However, since in most empirical analysis different structural stories 
may be consistent with the results obtained, an understanding of the fundamental structure of 
the markets under consideration is essential for a proper interpretation of the results 
(Goodwin, 2006).  
The empirical literature offers alternative explanations for asymmetric price adjustments2: 
market power at the retail level3(e.g. Boyd and Brorsen, 1988; Griffith and Piggott, 1994, and 
                                                 
1
 A review of the empirical issues underlying this literature can be found in Wohlgenant (2001). 
2
 See Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel (2004), Weldegebriel (2004) and Frey and Manera 
(2007) for a comprehensive review of the literature dealing with potential causes of asymmetries 
in vertical price transmission. 
Bettendorf and Verboven, 2000), adjustment costs at the retail level (Chavas and Mehta, 
2004), input substitution at the processing level (Bettendorf and Verboven, 2000), stocks at 
both the production and retail level (Reagan and Witzman, 1982), and public intervention 
(Kinnucan and Forker, 1987). However, in only a few cases (e.g. Peltzman, 2000) statistical 
tests have been carried out to link asymmetries with any of these potential explanations.  
Despite the many studies that have investigated vertical price adjustment processes along the 
food chain, results from the empirical literature are inconclusive. Studies generally differ in 
terms of the goods analysed, countries, time frequencies, time periods and model specification 
(Frey and Manera, 2007). Consequently, it is difficult to draw conclusions on which to base 
policy decisions (Vavra and Goodwin, 2005).  
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to investigate the asymmetries in the price 
transmission mechanism between farm and retail marketing channels in the Spanish lamb 
market. In particular, we focus on four issues: 1) the size of the price response at each end of 
the supply chain to a shock of a given size at the other end; 2) the speed and profile of the 
response; 3) whether responses are symmetric or asymmetic; 4) whether adjustments differ 
depending on direction (i.e., for shocks transmitted backwards or forwards along the supply 
chain). 
A Threshold Vector Error-Correction Model (TVECM) and the corresponding non-linear 
impulse response functions are presented. This methodological approach has been proved to 
be flexible enough to deal with the specific questions raised above. Moreover, it allows us to 
                                                                                                                                                        
3
 Although asymmetries have been linked to non-competitive behaviour, this is not necessary. 
McCorriston et al. (2001) showed that, in the presence of market power, price changes could be 
greater or less than the competitive benchmark case depending on the interaction between the 
market power and returns to scale. If the industry is characterised by decreasing returns to scale, 
the damping effect of market power is reinforced. On the other hand, if it is characterised by 
increasing returns to scale, the market power effect is offset. Weldegebriel (2004) concluded that 
the functional forms of retail demand and farm input supply are key factors in determining the 
level of price transmission and that the presence of market power does not necessarily mean 
imperfect price transmission. Finally, Azzam (1999) showed that retail prices might react more 
to a positive shock to producer prices than to a negative shock, generating asymmetries even in a 
competitive environment. 
test for the presence of non-linear adjustments in the price transmission mechanism 
commonly associated to menu costs. Although this approach is not new in the literature, this 
paper makes three key contributions. First, it exhaustively explores all empirical possibilities 
the analytical tool provides, paying special attention to statistical tests for correct 
specification. Second, the paper presents the regime-specific short-run dynamics, which have 
not been previously considered.  Finally, it is the first attempt to analyse the vertical price 
linkages in the Spanish lamb markets. In this context, results will be discussed taking the 
specific characteristics of the Spanish lamb sector into account.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the main characteristics of the 
Spanish lamb sector are described, including some potential explanations of non-linearities. 
Section 3 presents a description of the methodological approach used in the paper. Section 4 
deals with some preliminary data analyses while Section 5 reports our empirical results. 
Finally, Section 6 closes the paper with some concluding remarks. 
 
2 The Spanish lamb supply chain and potential sources of asymmetries 
Spain is the second largest lamb producer in the European Union (EU) just behind the United 
Kingdom. It represents around 5 per cent of Spain’s final agricultural production and 11 per 
cent of final livestock production. Moreover, lamb production plays a key economic role in 
rural areas: it is one of the few output options in arid areas, and 80 per cent of the total 
production is located in Less Favoured Areas (LFAs). 
Since the introduction of individual quotas in 1992, ewe numbers have been effectively 
stabilised throughout the Union as a whole. In Spain, breeding ewe numbers increased from 
18.3 million in 1992, only to 18.5 million in 2000.  Between 1990 and 2002, the number of 
slaughterings increased by 4 per cent to reach 20 million heads, while total meat production 
increased by 7.5 per cent to 221,000 tons. A specific characteristic of the Spanish lamb sector 
is that the average carcass weight is well under the EU average of 14.5 kg: nearly one quarter 
of slaughtered animals have a carcass weight lower than 10 kg (averaging just 7 kg), while for 
the rest the average weight is 12.6 kg. This is due to both to the breeds reared and to 
consumption habits, as Spanish consumers have strongly prefer younger animals with low fat 
and rose-coloured meat.  
Although the Common Market Organisation operating rules in force during the period studied 
may have influenced the movement of sheep on or off a holding, they did not prevent 
producers adapting production to meet consumer preferences.  However, the way the 
premium was calculated4 may have dissuaded producers whose flocks produced fewer lambs 
per ewe than the average from responding to market signals. In fact, as the premium paid 
declined as market prices rose, these flocks risked an income decline at higher prices per 
lamb. Conversely, however, because the premium was equal for all ewes, individual 
producers who achieved better than average market prices through improved quality or other 
market initiatives, and who produced more lamb per ewe than the average, could achieve 
higher margins. Consequently, farmer prices were not primarily determined by the ewe 
premium and producers had incentives to adapt to changing market conditions. In this context, 
it is not expected that public intervention was a potential cause of asymmetric price 
transmission along the Spanish lamb supply chain.  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of weekly farmer (FP) and retail (RP) prices in the period 1996-
2002. Farm prices are from the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries 
(MAPA)5. Retail prices come from the Boletín Económico del ICE (Ministry of Economic 
Affairs)6. 
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 The premium awarded annually to EU sheep producers was calculated as follows. First, the 
European Council decided a basic yearly price, which was thought to give a reasonable income 
to producers. Second, the Commission calculated a single market price using national prices 
weighted according to Gross Domestic Production (GDP). Income loss was determined as any 
difference, per 100 kg carcass weight, between the basic and the market prices. As the premium 
was awarded on a per ewe basis, a technical coefficient (the ratio between the number of heavy 
ewes and the production of heavy lambs expressed in kilos) was used to translate the premium to 
a per ewe figure.  
5
 The farm price is a weighted average of the five most representative markets in Spain (Ebro, 
Talavera de la Reina, Zafra, Albacete and Medina del Campo). These unpublished price data 
were sent to Brussels in order to obtain the European representative market price for lamb to 
calculate the ewe premium. We are grateful to the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture for 
permission to use these data. 
6
 Original retail prices are expressed in €/kg of a specific lamb cut (leg). In order to make retail 
prices comparable to farm prices and to calculate marketing margins, we have used a conversion 
factor of 1.2 to express the retail price in €/kg of carcass weight.  
(Insert Figure 1) 
Producer and retail prices exhibited a similar trend and a common seasonal component, which 
is more evident at the retail level. It can be seen that the retail price tended to react slightly 
later than the farm price when faced with changing market conditions.  
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the retail marketing margin both in absolute values (Figure 
2a) and as a percentage of the farm price (Figure 2b). While in the first case the marketing 
margin exhibits an upward trend, percentage changes have been quite stable on average 
(around 90 per cent of the farm price) during the period analysed, although it seems that 
volatility increased slightly. It also shows a strong deterministic component at the end of each 
year due to consumption habits.  
(Insert Figure 2) 
By construction, the evolution of marketing margins is related to changes in farm and retail 
prices. However, by visual inspection of Figures 1 and 2, the nature of this relationship is not 
clear enough. Therefore, we divided the sample period into two sub-periods depending on 
whether the relative marketing margin (Figure 2b) was increasing or decreasing. Then, we 
calculated the weekly average percentage change in farm and retail prices in each sub-sample 
to obtain, although very roughly, some indication about potential asymmetric behaviour 
(Figure 3). We note three main results. First, changes in marketing margins are primarily due 
to changes in farm prices (increases in farm prices squeeze the marketing margin and vice 
versa). Second, on average, positive changes in farm and retail prices seem to be larger than 
negative changes, although only very slightly. Finally, retail prices are fairly sticky in spite of 
changes in market conditions, indicating some kind of asymmetric price transmission. 
However, these issues have to be further explored with appropriate methodological tools, 
which will be the aim of the following sections. 
Asymmetries in the Spanish lamb meat market may arise due to the retailers’ use of market 
power to transmit input price increases faster than input price decreases. Retailers try to 
maintain their ‘normal’ profit margin when price rise, but they try to capture the larger 
margins that arise, at least temporarily, when farmer prices fall. In both cases, the situation 
lasts only as long as consumer search costs are present. When costly search is completed, 
prices tend towards competitive levels and profits go down. In Spain, the lamb marketing 
chain is highly concentrated downstream while farms generally lack the capacity to negotiate 
prices. In the past fifteen years, Europe (and, particularly, Spain) has witnessed a sharp 
increase in the trend of mergers and acquisitions within the food retail sector. In 2002, the 
largest retail company in Spain accounted for 31 per cent of market share (London 
Economics, 2004). The leader had a higher market share than the combined market shares of 
the second and third largest retailers, which only accounted for 25 per cent.  
(Insert Figure 3) 
Accountancy rules and inventory management strategies may also be responsible for the 
sluggish adjustment of retail prices to changes in farm prices variables. In the case of meat 
products, Spanish retailers have usually adopted the First-In First-Out (FIFO) criterion to 
valuing inventories (Ulloa, 2005). As a consequence, it is expected that retailers do not adjust 
prices immediately when costs change, but wait until stocks bought at pre-change prices are 
depleted, thus potentially reducing the speed of the price adjustment process.  
Finally, menu costs are not very important for explaining price transmission asymmetries 
along the lamb marketing chain. Azzam (1999) showed that when retailers incur re-pricing 
costs, changes in farm prices do not trigger retail price modifications. However, lamb meat is 
a perishable product mainly sold in big pieces that the butcher has to cut. No labels, apart 
from specific quality labels, are present. Stock levels are usually very low as retailers buy 
quite frequently. Thus, re-pricing costs are irrelevant, as retailers only have to change the 
price. In the case of specific cuts already packed, the stock disappears in less than a week. 
 
3 Modelling non-linear adjustments 
Asymmetries in vertical price transmission were initially investigated using variations of a 
model first developed by Wolffram (1971) and later modified by Houck (1977)7. The 
response of the retail price (RP) to a shock in the farm price (FP) was calculated by estimating 
the following equation: 
tt
-
t
-
ttt u∆FPDγ∆FPDγγ∆RP +++=
++
110   (1) 
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 However, empirical work to investigate asymmetries in price transmission started earlier and 
was based on the estimation of irreversible supply functions. Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel 
(2004) and Frey and Manera (2007) provide exhaustive reviews of methodological approaches to 
investigating price transmission using price data.  
where RP and FP are the retail price and farm prices, respectively, ∆ indicates first 
differences, +tD  and 
−
tD  are dummy variables that take the value 1 if 1tt FPFP −≥  and 
1tt FPFP −< , respectively, and 0, otherwise, γ0, γ
+ and γ -  are parameters to estimate, and ut 
is the disturbance term. From (1), the null hypothesis of symmetric price transmission (H0: 
γ+=γ -) can be tested against the alternative of asymmetry (Ha: γ+≠γ -).  
Equation (1) suffers from three main limitations. First, the response of retail prices to changes 
in farm prices is generally not instantaneous but instead is distributed over time. Second, it 
assumes that causality goes from farm to retail prices only (i.e. a cost-push price transmission 
mechanism). Third, the model does not adequately consider the time series properties of data.  
To solve the first limitation, Ward (1982) extended equation (1) by including lags of the 
exogenous variables: 
tjtt
N
j
jjt
M
j
tjt uFPDFPDRP +∆+∆+=∆ +−
−
=
−
+−
=
++ ∑∑ ))( 1
1
1
1
0 γγγ    (2) 
M and N in equation (2) can differ, as there is not a priori reason to expect identical lag-
lengths for the increasing and decreasing phases of prices transmission8.  
Equation (2) would be adequate to test for asymmetries in price transmission provided price 
series were stationary. However, price levels often exhibit non-stationary covariance, which 
may lead to autocorrelation problems in the asymmetric price response function. Moreover, if 
the price series are cointegrated, the estimated parameters in (2) would be biased as a result of 
the misspecification of the long-run relationships between prices. Von Cramon-Taubadel 
(1998) proposed an alternative specification of the Wolffram-Houck-Ward model based on 
the error correction representation. His method consists of estimating the following long-run 
relationship between the retail and the farm prices:  
tt10t uFPββRP ++=      (3) 
If tests prove that equation (3) is not a spurious regression (i.e. prices are cointegrated) the 
lagged residuals from the estimated equation ( 1ˆ −tu ) are divided into positive ( +−1ˆtu ) and 
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 See, for instance, Kinnucan and Forker (1987). 
negative components ( −
−1ˆtu ) (i.e. positive and negative deviations from the long-run 
equilibrium) and the following error correction model (ECM) is estimated: 
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10 ˆˆ  (4) 
Balke et al. (1998) also use an ECM to test for asymmetric adjustment. As parameters 
 
+ψ  
and −ψ in (4) are constant, the model assumes that a constant proportion of any deviation 
from the long-run equilibrium is corrected, regardless of the size of this deviation (i.e. the 
model is based on linear error correction) (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). The 
presence of fixed costs of adjustment along the food chain may generate non-linear reactions; 
that is to say, price adjustments may be different depending on both the magnitude and the 
sign of the initial shock. Thus, it is not unrealistic to suppose that only when the initial shock 
surpasses a critical threshold do economic agents react to it.  
Different methodological alternatives have been proposed in the literature to make 
cointegration and non-linear adjustments compatible. Chavas and Metha (2004) developed an 
augmented error correction model allowing the dynamic price adjustment to differ among 
regimes defined by the corresponding threshold parameters. However, under this approach, 
threshold parameters are exogenously determined. Partly for this reason, recent contributions 
have explored methodological alternatives that allow threshold parameters to be 
endogenously determined. Among these, the most commonly used are the Markov switching 
vector error correction model (MSVECM) (Krolzig and Toro, 2001), the threshold 
autoregressive model (TAR) (Balke and Fomby, 1997), and the threshold vector error 
correction model (TVECM) (Lo and Zivot, 2001). While the TAR model is a univariate 
procedure, the TVECM is multivariate. As such a procedure utilises the full structure of the 
model, it should have higher power, providing the model is true, than univariate procedures. 
Moreover, the TAR model assumes that only the adjustments to the equilibrium change with 
regimes, while the autoregressive parameters of the model remain constant. The MSVECM 
does not take the time series nature of price data into account, which may lead to a loss of 
efficiency, and greatly reduces the insights into the dynamics of price response that can be 
derived. Taking into account these considerations, we opted to use the TVECM to analyse the 
price transmission along the Spanish lamb marketing chain (providing that price series are 
non-stationary and cointegrated and that price adjustments are non-linear). 
More precisely, the approach followed in this paper is to start the analysis by considering a 
general three-regime threshold vector error correction model (TVECM3). In a second step, 
several tests are considered to check if the estimated model is preferable over a two-regime 
TVECM2 or a linear VECM. Finally, short-run dynamics are analysed. In the following two 
sub-sections we outline the main characteristics of the procedure used in this study. 
 
 
 3.1    Threshold cointegration  
Let Pt=(RPt,FPt)’ be a vector containing the logged prices of a good at retail and farm levels. 
If the two prices are I(1) time series cointegrated with cointegrating vector ),1( 2ββ −=′ , the 
linear VECM representation of order k of Pt can be written as: 
∑ ++=
−
=
−−
1
1
1 )]([
k
i
tititt uPP ∆Γβωα∆      (5) 
where 11 )( −− ′= tt Pββω  is the cointegrating vector evaluated at the generic value β=(1,-β2)’; Γi, 
i= 1, 2… are (2×2) matrices of short-run parameters; α is a (2×1) vector; and ut is a vector of 
disturbance terms that are assumed to be independently and identically Gaussian distributed, 
with covariance matrix Σ, which is assumed to be positive definite. β is the cointegrating 
vector which is defines the long-run equilibrium relationship between the two prices in Pt, 
while α gives the weights of the deviations from the cointegration relationship in the VECM 
equations.  
The three-regime threshold vector error correction model (TVECM3), can be written as: 
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where )(1 βω −t  is the threshold variable representing the residual of the equilibrium 
relationship (i.e. a deviation from equilibrium), and λ= ),( 21 λλ  are the threshold parameters 
that delineate the different regimes. As can be observed, the TVECM3 in (6) specifies that the 
adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium relationship is regime-specific. This model says 
that the dynamic adjustment of Pt depends on the magnitude of )(1 βω −t .  
In general, the threshold parameters ),( 21 λλ  are unknown and need to be estimated along 
with the remaining parameters of the model. Lo and Zivot (2001) proposed a strategy that 
combines Hansen’s (1999) approach to estimate two- and three-regime univariate TAR 
models and Tsay’s (1998) procedure for estimating a multivariate TVECM. This strategy 
consists of the following steps. 
In the first step, two-dimensional grid searches are carried out to estimate the threshold 
parameters ),( 21 λλ . Letting Ti be the number of observations in regime I and T the total 
number of observations in the sample, the threshold parameters are constrained such that 
0/ pi≥TTi , with pi0  typically set to 0.1. Conditional on λ= ),( 21 λλ , the TVECM3 in (6) is 
linear in the remaining parameters and may be estimated by iterative multivariate least 
squares minimising:  
),(ˆln),( 213213 λλΣλλ =S               (7) 
where ( )213 ,λΣ λˆ  is the estimated covariance matrix of (6), conditional on λ1 and λ2. 
The optimal threshold parameters can be estimated using the following optimisation 
program9: 
( )),(minarg)ˆ,ˆ( 21321 λλλλ S=      (8) 
In the second step, conditional on the estimated threshold parameters, the remaining 
parameters can be estimated by standard procedures and the residual covariance matrix is 
given by )ˆ(ˆ3 λΣ = ( )213 ,λΣ λˆˆˆ . Tsay (1998) showed that the conditional least squares estimator 
of the TVECM3 is strongly consistent as the sample size increases, and that the parameters of 
the αi and ij Γ  (j=1, …, k-1) matrices are asymptotically normally distributed. 
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 The grid research minimises the log determinant of the residual covariance matrix of the 
TVECM3, which is analogous to maximising a standard LR test statistic.  
A special case of the TVECM3 given in (6) occurs if price changes in the second regime (the 
middle one) are smaller than the transaction costs. In this case, prices will not adjust in this 
regime, implying that prices are not cointegrated, that is, α2=0. The resulting model is the so-
called Band-TVECM. In this case, if )(1 βω −t  is within the band, then prices are not 
cointegrated and Pt follows a VAR(k) without a drift. However, in the outer bands economic 
forces make prices move together, implying cointegration with different adjustment 
coefficients.  
As mentioned above, once the TVECM3 has been estimated, several tests can be used in the 
literature to check whether the dynamic behaviour and the adjustment towards the long-run 
equilibrium relationship is linear or exhibits threshold non-linearity (Hansen, 1999 and Tsay, 
1998). Lo and Zivot (2001) suggested that Hansen’s method for testing linearity in univariate 
TAR models, based on nested hypothesis tests, can be easily extended to test for linearity in 
multivariate TVECMs. So, they proposed the sup-LR statistic: 
( ))ˆ(ˆlnˆln 313 λΣΣ −= TLR     (9) 
where Σˆ  and )ˆ(ˆ3 λΣ are the residual covariance matrices of the VECM (5) and the three-
regime TVECM3 (6), respectively. 
The statistic to test this hypothesis suffers from the so-called problem of unidentified nuisance 
parameters under the null hypothesis. In other words, the non-linear model contains certain 
parameters that are not restricted under the null hypothesis and are not present in the linear 
model given by (5). Consequently, conventional statistical theory cannot be applied to obtain 
the asymptotic distribution of the statistics (Hansen, 1999 and Hansen and Seo, 2002). Given 
that the test statistic has a non-standard distribution, Hansen and Seo (2002) suggested using 
the fixed regressor bootstrap or, alternatively, a parametric residual bootstrap algorithm to 
compute the p-value for the linearity tests10.  
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 In both cases, we ran 1000 simulations to estimate the non-linear model replacing either the 
dependent variables (Pt) (fixed regressor bootstrap algorithm) or both the dependent and right-
hand regressors (parametric residual bootstrap algorithm) by iid N(0,1) draws. The proportion of 
simulations under the null for which the simulated LR exceeds the observed LR statistic gives 
the asymptotic p-value of the sup-LR test.  
Once the presence of threshold effects is confirmed, the second question to answer is what 
kind of threshold model is more appropriate for the data (number of regimes, usually two 
versus three). Lo and Zivot (2001) suggested using the following Likelihood Ratio (LR) 
statistic to test the null of a TVECM2 (two-regime model) against the alternative of a 
TVECM3 (three-regime model): 
[ ] [ ]( ))ˆ(ˆln)ˆ(ˆln 323,2 λΣλΣ −= TLR     (10) 
where )ˆ(ˆ2 λΣ  and )ˆ(ˆ3 λΣ  are the estimated residual covariance matrices from the unrestricted 
two-regime TVECM2 and three-regime TVECM3, respectively. The asymptotic distributions 
of LR2,3 are non-standard, and bootstrap methods can be used to compute approximate p-
values. 
As a final step, if the TVECM3 is chosen, it is possible to test whether such a model could be 
formulated as a Band-TVECM (α2=0). Since the estimated threshold parameters from the 
TVECM3 are superconsistent, as mentioned previously, then a Wald test can be used, which 
follows an asymptotic χ2 distribution.  
  3.2 Short-run dynamics 
In TVECMs the short-run dynamic behaviour of the variables is analysed by computing the 
impulse response functions (IRF). This can be particularly suitable for studying the time path 
response of variables to unexpected shocks at time t. However, given that the non-linear time 
series model does not have a Wold representation, computing the IRF for this type of model is 
not an easy task. In addition, as discussed in Koop et al. (1996), complications arise because 
in non-linear models i) the effect of a shock depends on the history of the time series up to the 
point where the shock occurs, and ii) the effect of a shock depends on the sign and the size of 
the shock. As a consequence, in non-linear models impulse response functions depend on the 
combined magnitude of the history, Pt-1=ϕt-1 , and the magnitude of shock, δ. 
Generalised impulse response functions (GIRF), introduced by Koop et al. (1996) and Potter 
(1995), capture the asymmetric response of the variables to one standard deviation of both 
positive and negative shocks.  The Non-linear Impulse Response Functions (NIRF) are 
defined in a similar way as traditional GIRF, except for replacing the standard linear predictor 
by a conditional expectation. Hence, the NIRF for a specific shock δ=tu  and history Pt-1=ϕt-
1  (the history of the system) is defined as: 
[ ]
[ ] N1, 0,n for  uuuPE                           
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Taking this definition into account, it is clear that the NIRF is a function of δ∈ut and ϕt-1∈Ωt-1 
(Ωt-1 is the history or information set at t-1 used to forecast future values of Pt). Given that δ 
and ϕt-1 are realisations of the random variables Ωt-1 and ut, Koop et al. (1996) stressed that 
NIRF themselves are realisations of random variables given by: 
[ ] [ ]111 |,|),,( −+−+− −= tntttnttt PEuPEunNIRF ΩΩΩ    (12) 
From (12), there are various alternative ways of calculating the NIRF, depending on the 
research objectives. For instance, in this study we wanted to assess the responses of farm 
(retail) prices to shocks in retail (farm) prices under different price evolution regimes and for 
different sizes and signs of the initial shock. In particular, the NIRF can be used to evaluate 
the degree of asymmetric responses over time. Potter (1995) defined a measure for assessing 
the asymmetric response to a particular shock, given a particular history ϕt-1, as the sum of 
NIRF for this particular shock and the NIRF for the shock of the same magnitude but with the 
opposite sign, that is: 
),,(),,(),,( 111 −−− −++= tititt nNIRFnNIRFunASY ϕδϕδϕ   (13) 
 
4 Data and preliminary analysis 
Weekly data of farmer prices (FP) and retail (RP) prices11 for period 1996-2002 were used. 
All variables were expressed in natural logarithms. Cointegration analyses between prices it 
commonly use logarithms because otherwise, with trending data, the relative error declines 
through time (Banerjee et al., 1993). Furthermore, from a statistical point of view, Hamilton 
(1994) pointed out that the logarithmic transformation mitigates fluctuations of individual 
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  Price series are expressed in nominal terms. Although cointegration is more likely to be found, by 
removing inflationary trends one would assume that the two prices are affected in the same manner by 
inflation and return to a long-run equilibrium in the same amount of time. Starleaf et al. (1985) and 
Larue (1991) showed that this assumption is incorrect, at least with US data. Moreover, as a result of 
low inflation in the period covered, there is no necessity to deflate prices series (Alderman, 1993).  
series increasing the likelihood of stationarity after first differencing. From an economic point 
of view, this transformation allows us to interpret results in percentage change terms12. 
Seasonality was investigated by implementing seasonal unit root tests for weekly data 
following the procedure suggested by Cáceres (1996)13. The results clearly suggest that 
seasonality is deterministic for the two price series. Accordingly, the systematic component of 
seasonality was captured, to be parsimonious, using a Fourier-type series expansion14, and the 
price series were seasonally adjusted. 
Unit root tests were conducted on the univariate time series. As such tests have limited power 
in small samples, two alternative unit root tests (Elliot et al., 1996; ;Ng and Perron, 2001) as 
well as the stationary test from Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) (KPSS) were applied. All results are 
consistent with the presence of a unit root without drift in the two price series, satisfying the 
first necessary condition for cointegration analyses15. 
 
5 Results 
Empirical specification of TVECM involves the following steps: i) under the assumption of 
price non-stationarity, testing for cointegration and estimating the cointegrating relationships; 
                                                 
12
 That is, prices are related in terms of percentage variations instead of absolute changes, which 
seems appropriate for marketing margins set in percentage terms, as is the case in the Spanish 
lamb marketing chain (Ulloa, 2005). Note also that absolute changes were not stationary while 
percentage variations oscillated around a stable mean (Figure 2). 
13
 The procedure is similar to that used by Franses (1991), for monthly data, and is based on the 
decomposition of the polynomial (1-L52). Results are available from the authors upon request. 
14
 Following Doran and Quilkey (1972) and Goodwin et al. (2002), the seasonal component (St) of 
each series has been captureed by estimating the following regression: 
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where p is the number of cycles within the year and swt indicates the order of the week within the year. 
Here, p has been set to 2, as with p=3, most of the estimated coefficients were insignificant. 
17
 Results are available upon request. 
ii) if cointegration is found, determining whether the dynamics of the data can be described by 
threshold-type non-linearities; iii) estimating the bivariate threshold error correction model 
(TVECM) if linearity is rejected, and iv) calculating non-linear Generalised Impulse 
Response functions in order to analyse the response of each price to unanticipated positive 
and negative shocks. Each of these steps is addressed in turn in this section. 
 
 
5.1 Cointegration analysis 
 In this section we address the first step for specifying a TVECM. Cointegration is tested 
using the likelihood ratio test introduced by Johansen (1988)16. A four-lag VAR system with a 
restricted constant was specified as the underlying model for carrying out cointegration rank 
tests. The optimum lag was selected on the basis of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and 
the Likelihood Ratio test proposed (Tiao and Box, 1981). Moreover, according to the results 
from the unit root tests, the hypothesis that E[∆Pt]=0 cannot be rejected for both prices, 
indicating that there is no evidence of a linear trend in the data. In any case, following Johansen 
(1995) several tests were conducted to select empirically the deterministic component introduced 
in the model. Results clearly indicate that a model with a restricted constant is statistically 
preferred.17 Misspecification tests for autocorrelation (Doornik and Hendry, 1997) indicated that 
the model specified with four lags and a restricted constant was quite satisfactory.  
Results from these tests indicated that, at the 5 per cent level of significance, the null 
hypothesis of one cointegrating vector could not be rejected (the trace statistic was 57.35, 
which is well above the critical value, 20.12). Given that the cointegrating rank is one, we 
tested whether the elasticity of price transmission between farm and retail prices is equal to 
unity in the long run. This hypothesis states that the cointegrating vector, β, should satisfy the 
long-run condition (1,-1). All the restriction tests on the cointegrating vector are 
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 Escribano and Mira (1996) showed that the cointegrating vector can still be estimated super-
consistently in the presence of neglected non-linearity in the adjustment process.  
17
 The null hypothesis of a restricted (unrestricted) constant against the alternative hypothesis of 
an unrestricted constant and a restricted trend was accepted at the 5 per cent significance level, as 
was the null of a restricted constant against the alternative of an unrestricted constant. 
asymptotically χ2(v) distributed, where v is the number of imposed restrictions18. The 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistic (1.19) did not reject the restriction at the 5 per cent 
significance level. In the long run, any change in the farm price generates a change of the 
same size at the retail level, keeping marketing margins constant over time, as shown in 
Figure 2b19. The restricted cointegrating vector is given by: 
lnRP – lnFP = 0.635        (14) 
The constant term in (14) represents the price spread at the retail level. Taking into account 
that all prices are expressed in logarithms, equation (14) represents percentage spread models 
with a mark-up of (eα-1) (α being the constant). Hence, the retail marketing margin can be 
expressed as follows: 
Retail margin = (eα-1)×FP×100  = 0.89 FP×100  per cent.   (15) 
 5.2 Threshold cointegration 
Once the presence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between the two prices has been 
detected, the next question is whether non-linearities exist in the adjustment process. This 
question was analysed using the procedure described in Section 3. We started by testing non-
linearity since, if the null of linearity is rejected, the number of regimes in the TVECM has to 
be determined considering the estimated cointegrating vector, given in (14), as the threshold 
variable (ωt-1)20. The results of testing LR linearity against the alternative of a multivariate 
TVECM3 (LR1,3) are shown in Table 1 and indicate that the null is rejected, at the 5 per cent 
level, in favour of the threshold model. 
(Insert Table 1) 
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 For further details, see Johansen (1995). 
19
 Although this result would imply perfectly competitive behaviour in the Spanish lamb chain, 
we have to interpret it with caution as we are only using price data. In fact, McCorriston et al. 
(2001) and Lloyd et al. (2006) showed that this result could be also compatible with the presence 
of market power and increasing returns to scale. 
20
 The residuals obtained from equation (14) can be interpreted as deviations from a long-term 
equilibrium. 
Next we tested which threshold model is more appropriate for characterising the non-linear 
dynamic adjustments of prices using the LR2,3 statistic given in expression (10). Table 1 
shows that the LR statistic rejects the null of a TVECM2 against the alternative of a three-
regime TVECM3, suggesting that price transmission along the Spanish lamb marketing chain 
can be characterised by a three-regime threshold process. At the bottom of Table 1, the 
estimated threshold parameters from the TVECM3 are shown ( )0065.0,0679.0(ˆ −−=λ ). In 
other words, and taking (14) into account, the TVECM splits the price adjustment process 
depending on whether the retail marketing margin lies below 76 per cent, above 87 per cent or 
between 76 per cent and 87 per cent. Figure 4 reports the evolution of farm and retail prices 
under the three regimes according to the corresponding threshold parameters. At the first 
regime the marketing margin is too low leading to a negative error-correction term, which 
causes the retail price to increase and the farm price to decrease. This is indeed what we 
observe in Figure 4 as at regime 1 the retail prices are in an increasing phase while the farm 
prices seem to reach their top and are ultimately going to decrease. In the third regime the 
retail margin is too high leading to a positive error-correction term making the retail price to 
decrease and the farm price to rise. Thus, as observed in Figure 4, at the regime 3 the retail 
price is in a decreasing phase while the farm price is at the bottom level and is ultimately 
going to increase.  
(Insert Figure 4) 
The estimated TVECM3 coefficients are shown in Table 2 along with the results from the 
misspecification tests. The results from the diagnostic tests suggest that the estimated model is 
adequate as there is no evidence of remaining residual autocorrelation, the ARCH tests fail to 
reject the null of homoscedasticity21 and, normality cannot be rejected. Moreover, the 
estimated parameters in the outer regimes (except 12α ) are significant at the 5 per cent level, 
and have the expected sign. However, in the middle regime (regime 2), both adjustment 
coefficients are not significant, indicating that adjustment only takes place beyond the edge of 
the threshold band. Within the band, the two prices move closer to each other but without 
following any specific pattern.  
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 Only in the case of the retail price the ARCH(52) statistic is borderline, with  p-value = 
0.0497. 
(Insert Table 2) 
Considering this result, the TVECM3 could be re-specified as a Band-TVECM as defined in 
Section 3. A Wald test accepted the hypothesis that the adjustment coefficients in the middle 
regime are jointly zero. Consequently, it can be concluded that the Band-TVECM is more 
appropriate than the unrestricted TVECM for representing the asymmetric adjustments of 
lamb prices along the market chain. 
To further illustrate the extent of asymmetric effects in our model, we calculated the half-life, 
which is the number of periods required to reduce one-half of a deviation from the long-run 
equilibrium. In case of a VAR(1), the half-life for the jth regime is obtained as follows: 
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However, for higher order VARs the calculation of the half-life is not straightforward22. In 
this paper we calculate them from the Persistence Profiles (PP) developed by Pesaran and 
Shin (1996). The Persistence Profiles provide information on the speed with which long-run 
relations, once shocked, will return to their equilibrium (i.e. the speed with which the effects 
of system-wide shocks on the cointegration relation disappears). The Persistence Profiles are 
calculated from the Impulse Response Functions (Section 3.2). Given than in non-linear 
models impulse response functions depend on both the history Pt-1=ϕt-1 and the magnitude of 
the shock δ, persistence profiles are also non-linear23: 
ββΩεω NIRFnPP ttt ′=− ),,( 1  
Since the Persistence Profiles start at unity and falls to zero as (T→∝), we can compute the 
half-life measure as the time horizon over which the Persistence Profile falls to 0.5. This 
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  We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
23
 In linear models the Persistence Profile of the cointegrating relation is given 
by ββω )()( nHnPP Pt ′= , where HP(n) is the system-wide impulse responses of variables (Pt) in 
the model. 
provides a simple measure of the speed of adjustment with which the stationary price 
relationship returns to its equilibrium.  
We calculated the Persistence Profiles for each regime (regimes 1 and 3) for system-wide 
shocks δ=±1.  Figure 5 shows that the speed of adjustment is faster in regime 3 than in regime 
1. In fact, the computed half-life associated with a positive (negative) shock starting at the 
upper regime is 4 weeks (7 weeks), which is significantly shorter than the half-life associated 
to positive (negative) shocks starting at the lower regime [18 weeks (12 weeks)]. A second 
interesting result is that, in the lower regime (i.e. when the marketing margin is below the 
lower threshold level) the reversion is faster when the initial shock is negative, while the 
opposite takes place in the upper regime (i.e. when the marketing margin is above the upper 
threshold level). That is, the speed of adjustment is faster when the sign of the initial shock is 
opposite to the marketing margin level. 
(Insert Figure 5) 
In any case, the key feature in threshold models is the significance of the estimated 
coefficients of the αj matrices associated with the cointegrating vector ωt-1(β). These 
coefficients can be useful to analyse which prices “equilibrium adjust”, and which do not. The 
estimated parameters of the Band-TVECM are: 
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where values in parentheses represent standard errors. 
The first point to note is that all adjustment coefficients corresponding to both the lower and 
the upper regimes are statically significant, which implies that both positive and negative 
deviations from the long-run price relationship revert to their original level. However, one 
main difference is observed in relation to the speed of adjustment. In the case of retail prices, 
in absolute values, the adjustment coefficients corresponding to the lower and the upper 
regimes (-0.062 and -0.058, respectively) are not statistically different24. This result is 
consistent with Figure 3 which shows that in the Spanish lamb chain retail price changes were 
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 The test statistic is 0.11, which is well under the critical value at the 5% level of significance 
(3.84).  
relatively small either when marketing margins increased or decreased. However, in the case 
of farm prices the adjustment coefficient corresponding to the upper regime is larger than that 
corresponding to the lower regime. 
Given the fact that the adjustment parameters of the retail price are not significantly different 
between regimes 1 and 3 while the adjustment parameter of the farm price in regime 1 
(regime 3) is smaller (higher) than the absolute value of the adjustment parameter of the retail 
price, if retail prices are increasing and farm prices are at their top and are ultimately going to 
decrease, then the too low retail margin in regime 1 will be squeezed while being adjusted 
upwards to equilibrium in comparison with the symmetric case in which the adjustment 
parameter of the farm price is not lower than the absolute value of the adjustment parameter 
of the retail price. Hence, a higher adjustment parameter of the farm price will lead to a faster 
speed of adjustment in case of a negative error-correction term. However, if the retail margin 
is too high as in regime 3, then it will also be squeezed while being adjusted downwards when 
compared with the situation in which the adjustment parameter of the farm price is not larger 
than the absolute value of the adjustment parameter of the retail price, because the farm price 
is increasing faster than the retail price is decreasing. But now, in regime 3, we see that with a 
positive error-correction term (in contrast to the negative error-correction term in regime 1) 
the speed of adjustment is faster than in regime 1. Consequently, the adjustment parameters 
show that excessively high retail margins (regime 3) last much shorter than retail margins that 
are too low (regime 1)25. These results are consistent with what we have observed previously 
in the Persistence Profiles (Figure 5) where the estimated half-life in the upper regime is 
substantially lower (4-7 weeks) than the one obtained for the third regime (12-18 weeks). 
However, not only the length but also the magnitude of responses matters. This is precisely 
what we are going to analyse in the following section.  
 
5.3  Short-run dynamics 
Short-run dynamics were analysed by computing the IRFs, which show the response of each 
price in the system to a shock in any other price. Non-linear IRFs (NIRF) were calculated for 
regimes 1 and 3. In a context of non-linear models, NIRFs are a very useful tool as they allow 
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 We thank to an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions to interpreting the adjustment 
parameters 
us to measure in a non-linear framework the responses to positive and negative shocks and the 
significance of asymmetric effects over time. Moreover, in which regime the shock occurs is 
relevant, as the response is regime-specific.  
In order to analyse the asymmetric behaviour of price adjustments, the NIRFs were computed 
for δ=±1 and ±2 and for history-specific regimes so that the long-run equilibrium relationship 
[ 1t1t Pβ)(βω −− ′= ] is above or below the upper and lower threshold values. In each regime, 
the NIRF for each forecasting horizon is the average across all possible Ni histories (with Ni 
being the number of observations in the ith regime) (Kapetanios, 2003). For each response, 
we computed the corresponding 95 per cent confidence intervals using bootstrapping 
techniques based on 5,000 replications26. The main results are shown in Figures 6 and 727. 
Significant responses are marked with a square symbol (closed for retail prices and open for 
farm prices). 
Figure 6 shows, in the upper part, the responses of both prices to a shock in farm prices in 
both regimes while, in the lower, Potter’s (1995) measure for assessing asymmetric responses 
is provided (see equation (13)). Under the first regime (retail margin is too low), a positive 
shock in the farm price squeezes the marketing margin for the first three weeks after the 
shock, as the retail price response is less than half that of the farm price28. To restore 
equilibrium, the farm price should ultimately decrease and the retail price should rise (this 
take place after 10 weeks). This behaviour can be explained by the perishability of the 
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 All the analyses have been carried out in GAUSS. We are grateful to Dr. Dick van Dijk for 
providing valuable information on how to tackle this cumbersome task.  
27
 In the upper part, and to reduce complexity, Figures 6 and 7 only show impulse responses for 
δ=±1, while in the lower part, the Potter’s measure is provided adding the responses for δ=±1 
and ±2. Impulse responses for δ=±2 follow the same pattern as those shown in the Figures. 
Results are available from authors upon request. 
28
 This result is also consistent with what we expected, although very roughly as we only 
considered contemporaneous but not lagged changes in Section 2 (Figure 3). 
product. In a phase of rising prices, retailers may prefer to accept a reduction in their 
marketing margin to avoid the risk of being left with a spoiled product29.  
 (Insert Figure 6) 
However, these margin losses are compensated in the case of excess supply shocks. As can be 
observed, a negative shock in farm prices stretches the retail margin significantly. Then if the 
retail margin becomes so high that regime 3 applies, then ultimately the farm price is going to 
increase and the retail price is going to decrease. For both farm and retail prices, the reaction 
to positive and negative shocks in farm price is positive-asymmetric (lower left panel of 
Figure 6): farm price increases are transmitted to all levels of the lamb chain faster than farm 
price decreases. Moreover, the asymmetric effect is greater in the case of the retail price, 
suggesting that inflation in food prices is not generated by cost increases but by increases in 
marketing margins. These results seem to indicate that retailers have market power in the 
lamb market in Spain, as is the case with most perishable products. In fact, as mentioned in 
Section 2, retailers are much more concentrated than farmers, at least in the case of 
supermarket and hypermarket chains operating at national level. 
Under the third regime (the retail margin is too high), the general pattern shown in Figure 6 is 
to some extent similar, although with a few differences that are consistent with the pattern of 
the adjustment coefficients shown in (16). First, in the very short run, the farm price response 
is higher than in the first regime (recall that 1232 αα > ), while retail price responses are of the 
same magnitude in both regimes. Second, convergence towards the long-run equilibrium takes 
place more quickly. Finally, as under the first regime, in the case of the retail price, the 
adjustment process is positive-asymmetric (lower right panel of Figure 6). However, in the 
case of the farm prices, we can consider that in the long run the adjustment is symmetric. In 
fact, in the first two weeks, the adjustment is positive-asymmetric but reverts to negative 
during the following five weeks before achieving long-run equilibrium. Also under the third 
regime, the magnitude of the asymmetric effect is higher in the retail price as a consequence 
of retailers’ market power along the lamb marketing chain.  
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 Qualitative research on the Spanish lamb chain indicates that after slaughter, it takes 1-2 days 
for the carcasses to be transported to the retailers. Once there, the product has to be sold on in 4-5 
days.   
Responses to shocks in retail prices are shown in Figure 7. As in the previous figure, in the 
upper part the responses of farm and retail prices, in both regimes, to a shock in the retail 
price are shown, while in the lower part, the Potter measure is also provided for the two 
regimes. Regime 1 means that the retail margin is too low. Then a positive (negative) shock in 
the retail price increases (decreases) the retail margin. To restore equilibrium, the farm price 
should ultimately increase (decrease) and the retail price should decrease (increase). This is 
what can be seen in Figure 7 (upper left) after about 3-4 weeks. In any case, convergence with 
the retail price responses is reached after six months. Thus, in the short run retailers benefit 
from a demand shock as the marketing margin increases substantially.  
(Insert Figure 7) 
Farm price responses are also different for negative shocks as compared to positive shocks. 
Responses to negative shocks are larger in the short run whereas after 14 weeks the opposite 
occurs. Thus, farm price responses to a shock in the retail price exhibit a cyclical asymmetric 
pattern in the short run, and become positive-asymmetric in the long run. 
Comparing the asymmetric behaviour of both retail and farm prices to demand shocks in the 
first regime shows that the situation is somewhat different to the supply shock situation 
represented in Figure 6. In this case, retailers benefit from increasing marketing margins 
during the first 15 weeks. However, this initial effect is compensated during the following 15 
weeks, as the magnitude of the asymmetric effect is greater in the case of the farm price.  
Finally, under the third regime (the retail margin is too high), a negative shock in the retail 
price decreases the retail margin. Then if the retail margin becomes too low that regime 1 
applies. To restore equilibrium the farm price is going to increase and the retail price is going 
to decrease. Contrary to the first regime, responses to both positive and negative shocks are 
similar while convergence takes place more quickly (10 weeks). Finally, the most interesting 
result is that it is only in this case (excess supply) that farm and retail price responses to 
positive and negative demand shocks are symmetric. 
 
5 Conclusions 
This paper has explored the non-linearity in the price transmission mechanism along the lamb 
marketing chain in Spain. The methodology used involved specifying and estimating a three-
regime TVECM. Price reactions in the intermediate regime are not significant, allowing us to 
specify a Band-TVECM. The paper presents the regime-specific long-run equilibrium 
analysis and short-run dynamics. The results obtained suggest a number of points. 
In the long run, prices at both ends of the marketing chain are perfectly integrated, that is to 
say, any change in either of the prices is fully transmitted to the other. However, in the short 
run, price behaviour is found to be asymmetric. Market power at the retail level (two thirds of 
total lamb sales at retail level are located in supermarkets and hypermarkets of which the 
market share of the top-five is around 74 per cent), product perishability together with 
accountancy rules and inventory management strategies are possible explanations of the short-
run asymmetric price transmission.  
The three-regime threshold error correction model allowed us to fully emphasise the 
asymmetric nature of the adjustment mechanism, which varies according to the size, and sign 
of the equilibrium error. The first regime is associated with lower marketing margins while 
the third is associated higher margins. The short-run dynamics in both regimes are similar 
although the speed of adjustment is faster when retail margins are higher. This price 
transmission mechanism is explained by the specific characteristics of the lamb production 
and consumption in Spain. While production is mainly concentrated during spring, leading to 
lower farm prices (which, on the other hand, increase along the rest of the year), the highest 
consumption levels are associated to Christmas Holidays, leading to higher prices for a short 
period of time. Thus, when farm prices have reached their top and are going to decrease, retail 
prices are increasing generating lower marketing margins. The opposite takes place after 
Christmas, generating higher marketing margins. The quick decrease of retail prices after 
December makes the speed of adjustment faster when retail margins are higher.   
In an environment of lower marketing margins, negative (positive) supply shocks squeeze 
(stretch) the marketing margin. At both ends of the supply chain, responses are always 
positive-asymmetric, that is, negative supply shocks are transmitted faster than positive 
shocks. In any case, the magnitude of the asymmetric effect is higher at the retail level, 
indicating that retailers benefit from increasing marketing margins. On the other hand, 
positive (negative) demand shocks stretch (squeeze) the marketing margin. Again in this case, 
at the retail level, positive shocks are more persistent, thus generating positive asymmetries. 
At the farm level, demand shocks generate, in the long run, positive-asymmetric responses. 
However, during the first 15 weeks, negative shocks are more persistent, increasing price 
spreads. 
In a high retail margin situation, the general pattern is somewhat different. First, as mentioned 
above, responses converge more rapidly to the long-run equilibrium. As in the previous case, 
retailers benefit from supply shocks, as responses to negative shocks are more persistent than 
those to positive shocks, generating positive asymmetries in the first 7 weeks.  At farm level, 
the long-run adjustment seems to be symmetric. While in the very short run (two weeks) 
negative supply shocks are more persistent than positive supply shocks, this is reversed in the 
following 5 weeks. In any case, as in the price-increasing situation, retailers benefit from 
higher marketing margins, as the asymmetric effect is higher at the retail level. Finally, 
positive and negative demand shocks generate symmetric responses at both levels of the 
marketing chain.  
The analysis has focused on vertical price adjustments in the Spanish lamb marketing chain. It 
can be extended in several directions. First, other meat sectors in Spain with different market 
structures (different degrees of market integration) or other food sectors with different 
characteristics (branded products, more processed products, non-perishable products) could be 
investigated in order to improve our understanding of the price transmission mechanism. 
Second, further applications to the same sector in other countries with different market 
structures would allow us to link our results with market power or stock holding policies. 
Third, taking into account that the methodological approach followed in this paper uses price 
data only, structural models could be developed in the future, where data availability permits, 
in order to investigate the main determinants of the evolution of marketing margins. Finally, 
further refinements from the methodological point of view could be made in the future as new 
theoretical econometric issues arise in the context of non-linear models in a multivariate 
framework. 
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Table 1. Tests for non-linearities in price adjustments 
 LR1,3a LR2,3 b 
Test statistic 89.72 63.91 
FR critical value (5%)c  
PR critical value (5%)d 
43.46 40.72 
51.55 48.29 
Threshold parameters )0065.0,0679.0(ˆ −−=λ  
 
a The LR1,3 tests the null of linearity against the alternative of a three-regime TVECM (Lo and Zivot, 
2001).  
b The LR2,3 tests the null of a two-regime TVECM against the alternative of a three-regime TVECM 
(Lo and Zivot, 2001).  
c Critical values are obtained using the fixed regressor (FR) bootstrapping technique (Hansen and Seo, 
2002). 
d Critical values are obtained using the parametric residual (PR) bootstrap algorithm (Hansen and Seo, 
2002). 
Table 2. Estimated parameters of the TVECM3a 
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% of 
observations 
33.33 38.33 28.33 
Misspecification tests 
Farm prices Retail prices 
BG(1)-FPc 2.59 BG(1)-RP 0.44 
BG(52)-FPc 1.46 BG(52)-RP 1.13 
ARCH(1)-FPc 3.84 ARCH(1)-RP 3.32 
ARCH(52)-FPd 3.76 ARCH(52)-RP 3.86 
JB-FPe 3.04 JB-RP 4.02 
 
a. Values in parentheses are standard deviations. 
b. 0.635ˆ1 −−=− FPRP)β(ωt . 
c. BG(i) is the Breusch-Godfrey test for autocorrelation of order i (critical value at the 5% 
significance level is 3.84). 
d. ARCH (i) is the Engle test for conditional heteroscedasticity of order i (critical value at the 
5% significance level is 3.84). 
e. JB is the Jarque-Bera test for normality (critical value at the 5% significance level is 5.99). 
 
Figure 1. Farm and retail prices for lamb in Spain (€/kg of equivalent carcass weight) (1996-
2002)  
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Source: MAPA, ICE and own calculations 
 
 
Figure 2.Evolution of the retail marketing margin (1996-2002)  
a) RP-FP, absolute values (€/kg)              b) RP/FP, percentage of farm price 
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Note: RP = retail price; FP = farm price 
Figure 3. Behaviour of farm and retail prices when marketing margins are increasing or 
decreasing (average weekly percentage changes during 1996-2002) 
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Figure 4. Classification of prices evolution under the three regimes (€/kg) 
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Figure 5. Persistence Profiles to a 1% positive and negative shock in the cointegrating vector 
under the two regimes 
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Note: PP_Ri(δ) indicates the Persistence Profile in the i-th regime i (i=1,3) to a system-wide 
shock δ (δ=1,-1) 
Figure 6. Impulse response functions to a positive and negative shock in FP under the two 
regimes1 
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Note that □ (■) indicates that the farm (retail) response is significant at the 5% level 
1
 In the upper part only impulse responses for δ=±1 are shown, while in the lower part, the 
Potter’s measure is provided adding the responses for δ=±1 and ±2.  
Figure 7. Impulse response functions to a positive and negative shock in RP under the two 
regimes1 
         Shock in RP (Regime 1)                                       Shock in RP (Regime 3) 
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     Asymmetric responses (Regime 1)                    Asymmetric responses (Regime 3) 
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Note that □ (■) indicates that the farm (retail) response is significant at the 5% level 
1
 In the upper part only impulse responses for δ=±1 are shown, while in the lower part, the 
Potter’s measure is provided adding the responses for δ=±1 and ±2.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
